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Abstract
In this article, I focus on the difference in moral judgment of macroeconomic interventions 
between the deterministic world of a thought experiment and the uncertain reality. The 
macroeconomic theory coined by Keynes is, in its most popular reading, deterministic 
and justifies interventionism. However, incorporating uncertainty into the analysis leads 
to the contrary result. Namely, if economic output is a random process, such as Gaussian 
white noise or a stochastic Markov chain, then intervening can bring either economic re-
covery or inflationary pressure and a next bubble. In the trolley-problem philosophy, the 
one who pulls the lever instead of the trolley itself is believed to be guilty of the death 
of an innocent passer-by standing on the side track. Similarly, if the Federal Reserve de-
cided to intervene and failed (causing a bubble on the house market, instantiating), their 
monetary policy can be said to be a cause of the financial crisis. Therefore, governments 
should refrain from interventions.
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We are all faced throughout our lives with agonizing 
decisions. Moral choices. Some are on a grand scale. 
Most of these choices are on lesser points. But! We define 
ourselves by the choices we have made.
Professor Levy in Woody Allen’s 
Crimes and Misdemeanours
1. Introduction
The trolley problem had to be solved in real life. In Oakland, Daphne Jones approached 
it from the utilitarian viewpoint. She pulled a trolley switch in order to save 5 lives and 
was found guilty of murdering a passer-by who happened to be standing on the oth-
er track.2 The sentence was motivated by Ms. Jones’ acknowledgment of the fact that 
her action would save five people but kill Chester Farley. In contrast to the imaginary 
world of thought experiments, assuming that no one is tied to the track, there is no 
certainty in decision-making. In real life, Ms. Jones could only act according to pre-
dictions on whether the people standing in front of a speeding trolley are able to run 
away or not. 
In the literature, there is a very limited number of analyses whose authors in-
corporate uncertainty into the trolley-problem. To the best of my knowledge, Han 
et. al.3 are the first philosophers who indicated uncertainty as a possible reason why 
people questioned by moral psychologists are likely to pull the lever but not to push 
down an overweight stranger on the track. Namely, it is the unavoidable death of the 
fat man and the possibility that the person standing on the side-track will slip away 
that make the difference. However, most philosophers living in the deterministic 
world of thought experiments argued that the moral judgments of these two situations 
differ because of incorporating the doctrine of double effect introduced by Thom-
as Aquinas.4
Similarly, the vast majority of macroeconomists and monetary-policy specialists be-
lieve in the necessity of conducting monetary and fiscal interventions. In this essay, I ar-
gue in favor of the contrary point of view. Namely, I show that the popularly held belief 
is only justified as long as the economy is a deterministic process. However, incorporating 
uncertainty into this analysis shows that active monetary and fiscal policy can expand the 
cyclical changes of the economic output instead of reducing it. The essay consists of four 
sections. First, I discuss Keynesian macroeconomic theory in its deterministic form and 
2 Th. Cathcart, The Trolley Problem, or Would You Throw the Fat Guy Off the Bridge? A Philosophical Co-
nundrum, Workman Publishing, New York 2013, p. 11. The story described in the popular introduction to an-
alytical ethics is imaginary, however, giving names makes the trolley-problem considerations more thrilling.
3 J. Han, A. Saptawijaya, L. Pereira, Moral reasoning under uncertainty, “International Conference on Logic 
for Programming Artificial Intelligence and Reasoning”, Springer, Berlin 2012.
4 A. Lanteri, Ch. Chelini, S. Rizzello, An Experimental Investigation of Emotions and Reasoning in the Trolley 
Problem, “Journal of Business Ethics” 2008, Vol. 83, pp. 789–804.
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conclude that this kind of reasoning justifies interventionism. Second, in order to bridge 
the gap between the two worlds of theory and reality, I analyze the business cycle as a ran-
dom process in terms of the real business-cycle theory (RBC theory). Third, I generalize 
the trolley problem by incorporating uncertainty and, by analogy, analyze if policymak-
ers should intervene. Finally, I conclude by indicating that (1) it is better to observe a re-
cession than to cause one, (2) economic interventions are doomed if the economic world 
is inherently indeterministic, and (3) governments should refrain from intervening in or-
der not to be accused of causing recessions.
2. Macroeconomics from the Keynesian perspective
At the onset of the last financial crisis of 2007–2008, Keynesian thought came back 
to mainstream economics and the previously popular belief in self-regulating mar-
kets faded away. Several of the most inf luential economists repeated Keynes’ the-
ory when they were formulating a cure for the crisis (cf., Nobel Laureate voices: 
Robert Shiller’s last book The subprime solution5 or Paul Krugman’s The New York 
Times article6) and highlighted the necessity of government interventions. In a sim-
ilar vein, several central banks (American, British, and German, among others) pur-
sued multi-billion bailouts in order to stimulate the economy. In spite of a few op-
ponents of the stimuli packages, the interventionist viewpoint became mainstream. 
Among others, Robert Lucas questioned the theoretical assumptions underlying the 
current fiscal policy7 and Robert Barro with Gary Becker indicated that there is no 
empirical evidence supporting fiscal expansion8 (however, the opposite is believed 
to be true by most economists).
In general,9 Keynesian economists believe that depressions are caused by an insuf-
ficient level of demand. The macroeconomic situation can be analyzed in terms of the 
Hicks-Hansen model given by the following two equations aimed at finding a general 
equilibrium between investment and saving (IS), and between liquidity preference and 
money supply (LM):10
5 R. Shiller, The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened, and what to Do about 
it, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2012.
6 P. Krugman, Fighting Off Depression, “The New York Times”, 5th January 2009. http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/05/opinion/05krugman.html?_r=0 (retrieved: 26th September 2009).
7 R. Lucas, The other-worldly philosophers, “The Economist”, 16th July 2009, http://www.economist.com/
node/14030288 (retrieved: 26th September 2009).
8 R.J. Barro, Keynesian Economics vs. Regular Economics, “The Wall Street Journal”, 23rd August 2011.
9 Here, I briefly discuss neo-Keynesian economics in the form established by John Hicks, Franco Modigliani 
and Paul Samuelson. I certainly do not pretend to review the Keynesian school of macroeconomics or cover 
the whole theory in detail.
10 L. Klein, IS-LM Model: Its Role in Macroeconomics [in:] IS-LM and Modern Macroeconomics, eds. W. Young, 
B. Zilberfarb, Springer, Tel Aviv 2012, p. 152.
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2. Macroeconomics from the Keynesian perspective 
At the onset of the last financial crisis of 2007–2008, Keynesian thought came back to 
mainstream economics and the previously popular belief in self-regulating markets faded 
away. Several of the most influential economists repeated Keynes’ theory when they were 
formulating a cure for the crisis (cf., Nobel Laureate voices: Robert Shiller’s last book The 
subprime solution5 or Paul Krugman’s The New York Times article6) and highlighted the 
necessity of government interventions. In a similar vein, several central banks (American, 
British, and German, among others) pursued multi-billion bailouts in order to stimulate the 
economy. In spite of a few opponents of the stimuli packages, the interventionist viewpoint 
became mainstream. Among others, Robert Lucas questioned the theoretical assumptions 
underlying the current fiscal policy7 and Robert Barro with Gary Becker indicated that there is 
no empirical evidence supporting fiscal expansion8 (however, the opposite is believed to be 
true by most economists). 
 In general, 9 Keynesian economists believe that depressions are caused by an 
insufficient level of demand. The macroeconomic situation can be analyzed in terms of the 
Hicks-Hansen model given by the following two equations aimed at finding a general 
equilibrium between investment and saving (IS), and between liquidity preference and money 
supply (LM): 10 
𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟, 𝑌𝑌) = 𝑆𝑆(𝑟𝑟, 𝑌𝑌) 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝐿𝐿(𝑟𝑟, 𝑌𝑌) 
where: 
𝑟𝑟 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖; 
𝑌𝑌 − 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖; 
 According to the IS-LM model, demand and employment depend on the following 
three exogenous variables: government budget, money in circulation, and business 
expectations. Of the three determinants, the latter two were endogenically lowered when the 
                                                          
5 R. Shiller, The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global Financial Crisis Happened, and what to Do about it, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 2012. 
6 P. Krugman, Fighting Off Depression, “The New York Times”, 5th January 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/05/opinion/05krugman.html?_r=0 (retrieved: 26th September 2009). 
7 R. Lucas, The other-worldly philosophers, “The Economist”, 16th July 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14030288 (retrieved: 26th September 2009). 
8 R.J. Barro, Keynesian Economics vs. Regular Economics, “The Wall Street Journal”, 23rd August 2011. 
9 Here, I briefly discuss neo-Keynesian economics in the form established by John Hicks, Franco Modigliani and 
Paul Samuelson. I certainly do not pretend to review the Keynesian school of macroeconomics or cover the 
whole theory in detail. 
10 L. Klein, IS-LM Model: Its Role in Macroeconomics [in:] IS-LM and Modern Macroeconomics, eds.  
W. Young, B. Zilberfarb, Springer, Tel Aviv 2012, p. 152. 
According to the IS-LM model, demand and employment depend on the following 
three exogenous variables: government budget, money in circulation, and business expecta-
tions. Of the three determinants, the latter two were endogenically lowered when the finan-
cial crisis broke. First, financial institutions lost a fraction of their assets due to the bubble 
on the housing market in the United States and writing off the bad debts. Additionally, 
at the e d of 2008, no on  knew which institut on  suffered from owing worthless collat-
eralized debt obligations (CDOs) and therefore, because of risk aversion, the interbank 
loan market evaporated. Second, multi-billion losses reported by several international 
banks and other financial institutions caused business moods to plunge. This mechanism 
reduced the aggregated d mand which, under the Keynesian c ndition of sticky prices,
lowered the output.
Since policymakers can directly control only the third factor, i.e. government spend-
ing, bailouts were implemented in order to bridge the recessionary gap between the po-
tential product and the actual one.11 However, the other two factors shaping demand (i.e. 
money in circulation and business expectations) can be controlled in an indirect way, 
by means of setting the interest rate. In this approach, reducing interest rates raises the 
opportunity cost of holding cash instead of other assets (e.g. securities), which usually 
makes the aggregated demand rise. These are the two methods of policymaking suggest-
ed by Keynesian macroeconomics.12
3. Incorporating uncertainty
Simplifying,13 it is justified to highlight that ethical dilemma does not arise if the Keynesi-
an theory is interpreted in a determinist way and we can justifiably believe that the IS-LM 
model rightly describes the real economy. However, in macroeconomics, there is a nev-
11 The details are delivered, for instance, by Klein (op. cit., pp. 151–161).
12 Other schools of thought highlight other alternatives, such as changing the institutional setting aimed at mak-
ing markets more efficient or supporting long-term growth by diminishing the influence of government on econ-
omy. 
13 Usually, macroeconomic interventions influence not only how much is produced but also cause wealth re-
distribution. Therefore, even if one knew with certainty that an intervention would result in macroeconomic 
recovery, it might be ethically wrong to fund a bailout because interventionism makes innocent people pay for 
the choices which led to the economic crisis committed by others.
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er-ending dispute between right- and left-wing economists. Or, in other words, between 
interventionists and liberals. Today, there are several macroeconomic theories which are 
contradictory in several aspects. Macroeconomic interventions are based on theories 
which, in contrast to the situation of different sciences, are not widely supported or be-
lieved to be corroborated. Therefore, ethical judgment on macroeconomic interventions 
should be grounded in an analysis including uncertainty.
The definitions of uncertainty used in various fields differ to a high degree. Below, 
I draw from the tradition proposed by economists. Economics has a long history of deal-
ing with the unknown, but uncertainty is still neglected. In relation to this field, there are 
two degrees of a lack of knowledge: risk and uncertainty. The former term is used to de-
scribe situations where alternative scenarios can be described in terms of probability and 
are perfectly suited to analyze gambling, life insurance issues (thanks to the law of great 
numbers), and option pricing under the condition of the Gaussian return distribution. 
By contrast, the latter term is used to describe situations where either probability of al-
ternative scenarios is unknown, or there is no knowledge of possible outcomes. In oth-
er words, uncertainty cannot be measured. This differentiation was started in economics 
by Frank Knight in the early twentieth century: 
Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of risk, 
from which it has never been properly separated… The essential fact is that ‘risk’ means 
in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is some-
thing distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial differences 
in the bearings of the phenomena depending on which of the two is really present and 
operating… It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we shall 
use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an un-
certainty at all.14
The ethical dilemma of the question whether it is right for a policy-maker to inter-
vene during a recession is also trivial when risk (instead of uncertainty) is incorporated 
into the analysis, which can be illustrated with the case of considering a bailout during the 
last financial crisis. Let me consider the following thought experiment (see Graph 1) based 
on the two-period model: time t, when the decision if an intervention should be conducted 
is made, and t+1, the whole future, consisting of all results of the choice. There are three 
scenarios. First, the policy-maker does not decide to provide public support for financial 
institutions which own bad debt, some of them fail and, according to the estimates deliv-
ered by analysts, economic output is reduced because of a mild recession caused by a few 
bankrupted banks and raised risk aversion. Second, the policy maker decides to bail out 
banks, which lowers risk aversion and, by means of raised money in circulation, creates 
another bubble.15 Third, which is more likely, the stimuli package is successful and the 
economy recovers.
14 F. Knight, op. cit., p. 19.
15 In fact, it happened a few years ago, when the Federal Reserve decided to stimulate the American economy 
after the dot-com bubble collapsed in 2001. The interest rates close to the zero bound and fiscal stimulus start-
ed the house-market bubble, which resulted in the great recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s.
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Graph 1. Macroeconomic interventions under risk. An exemplary case study
risk aversion and, by means of raised money in circulation, creates another bubble.15 Third, 
which is more likely, the stimuli package is successful and the economy recovers. 
Graph 1: Macroeconomic interventions under risk. An exemplary case study. 
 
 Since risk is understood in economics as a situation of limited knowledge where 
various scenarios or possibilities can be attributed to its quantifiable likelihood, policy-makers 
should calculate the expected value of each decision and choose the best, most useful (in 
terms of the value of output) possibility, i.e. fund the bailout. Here, for simplicity, I assume 
that the policy-makers ground their decision in utilitarian ethics (which is justified by the long 
tradition of incorporating this approach into economics)16 and do not consider risk aversion. 
That is, I do not calculate nor consider the variance of the possible outcomes but only the 
average outcome. Additionally, I do not pretend to make the thought experiment realistic by 
incorporating the political theory of the business cycle. In other words, policy-makers might 
be driven by maximizing economic output before the next election. 
 In contrast to the above thought experiment, there is no certainty in economic 
policymaking, and describing it in terms of risk instead of uncertainty relies on so many 
assumptions that, as Uskali Mäki17 put it in his most recent critique of the current state of 
economics, such models irrelevantly resemble reality. There are three kinds unknown in the 
studied dilemma: (1) whether the IS-LM model relevantly frames the modeled phenomenon, 
                                                          
15 In fact, it happened a few years ago, when the Federal Reserve decided to stimulate the American economy 
after the dot-com bubble collapsed in 2001. The interest rates close to the zero bound and fiscal stimulus started 
the house-market bubble, which resulted in the great recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s. 
16 G. Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics, Cengage Learning, New York 2008, p. 442; R. Posner, The 
Economics of Justice, Harvard University Press, Harvard 1983, p. 48.  
Posner explicitly states that economics is equated with utilitarianism in some circles. 
17 U. Mäki, Modelling failure [in:] H. Leitgeb, I. Niiniluoto et al., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 
– Proceedings of the 15th International Congress, College Publications, Helsinki 2016, p. 6. 
Is the bailout be 
funded?
Yt=10
Yes
Yt+1=11; p=0.6
Yt+1=7; p=0.4
No Yt+1=9
Since risk is understood in economics as a situ tion of limited knowledge where var-
ious scenarios or possibilities can be attributed to its quantifiable likelihood, policy-mak-
ers should calculate the expected value of each decision and choose the best, most useful 
(in terms of the value of output) possibility, i.e. fund the bailout. Here, for simplicity, I as-
sume that po icy-makers gr und their decision in utilitarian ethics (which s justified 
by the long tradition of incorporating this approach into economics)16 and do not consid-
er risk aversion. That is, I do not calculate nor consider the variance of the possible out-
comes but only the average outcome. Additionally, I do not pretend to make the thought 
experiment realisti  by incorporating the politic l theory of the usiness cycle. In other 
words, policy-makers might be driven by maximizing economic output before the next 
election.
In contrast to the above thought experiment, there is no certainty in economic pol-
icymaking, and describing it in terms of risk instead of uncertainty relies on so many 
assumptions that, as Uskali Mäki17 put it in his most recent critique of the current state 
of economics, such models irrelevantly resemble reality. There are three kinds unknown 
in the studied dilemma: (1) whether the IS-LM model relevantly frames th  modeled phe-
nomenon, (2) what results the considered intervention will bring, and (3) whether the re-
cession is caused by reduced demand. All these doubts are interconnected and still pro-
voke lively discussions among economists. Simplifying, the IS-LM model can be believed 
to possess essesimilitude when recessions are caused by reduced d ands. In this case, 
only the second question remains open. In other words, it is unknown what results will 
bring an intervention. The stimuli package can be too small to make the economy recov-
er or too huge and raise the inflationary pressure. Aikman et al.18 compared economies 
16 G. Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics, Cengage Learning, New York 2008, p. 442; R. Posner, The 
Economics of Justice, Harvard University Press, Harvard 1983, p. 48. Posner explicitly states that economics 
is equated with utilitarianism in some circles.
17 U. Mäki, Modelling failure [in:] H. Leitgeb, I. Niiniluoto et al., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Sci-
ence – Proceedings of the 15th International Congress, College Publications, Helsinki 2016, p. 6.
18 D. Aikman, Ph. Barrett, S. Kapadia et al., Uncertainty in macroeconomic policy-making: art or science?, 
“Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society” 2011, Vol. 369, pp. 4798–4817.
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to a complex system and argued that they are, at best, deterministic in a chaotic way and 
indicated dependence on the ‘state of beliefs of the systems’ participants’19 as a source 
of inherent randomness.
Additionally, recessions can also be caused by real, supply-side shocks. According 
to the real-business-cycle theory,20 recessions are observed when exogenous shocks 
happen. For instance, if an oil tanker sinks then (1) oil prices make production of goods 
more expensive, (2) customer prices rise and (3) a new general equilibrium is set at high-
er prices and a lower output. Assuming that this point of view is correct and, like the 
viewpoint of the efficient-market hypothesis theorists21 that both negative and positive 
shocks happen randomly, then theeconomic product (without considering the chang-
es in technology which would create a positive drift) can be modeled by the follow-
ing equation:
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(2) what results the considered intervention will bring, and (3) whether the recession is caused 
by reduced demand. All these doubts are interconnected and still provoke lively discussions 
among economists. Simplifying, the IS-LM model can be believed to possess essesimilitude 
when recessions are caused by reduced demands. In this case, only the second question 
remains open. In other words, it is unknown what results will bring an intervention. The 
stimuli package can be too small to make the economy recover or too huge and raise the 
inflationary pressure. Aikman et al.18 compared economies to a complex system and argued 
that they are, at best, deterministic in a chaotic way and indicated dependence on the ‘state of 
beliefs of the systems’ participants’19 as a source of inherent randomness. 
 Additionally, re ssions can also  caused by real, supply-side shocks. Acc rding to 
the real-business-cycle theory,20 recessions are observed when exogenous shocks happen. For 
instance, if an oil tanker sinks then (1) oil prices make production of goods more expensive, 
(2) customer prices rise and (3) a new general equilibrium is set at higher prices and a lower 
output. Assuming that this point of view is correct and, like the viewpoint of the efficient-
market hypothesis theorists21 that both negative and positive shocks happen randomly, then 
theeconomic product (without considering the changes in technology which would create 
a positive drift) can be modeled by the following equation: 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀 
where: 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 - output in the t+1 year; 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 - output in the t year; 
𝜀𝜀- influence of a random shock. 
 In this case, a future economic product depends only on output from the previous year 
and random exogenous shocks. In other words, interventions do not influence the real 
economy, only price levels. Which of these two theoretical approaches to macroeconomics is 
empirically adequate? The never-ending discussions among economists do not seem to lead to 
a constructive conclusion. Most likely, various theories adequately describe different kinds of 
macroeconomic environment. For instance, Keynes’ approach should be employed to deal 
with recessions caused by insufficient demand and the real business-cycle theory to 
                                                          
18 D. Aikman, Ph. Barrett, S. Kapadia et al., Uncertainty in macroeconomic policy-making: art or science?, 
“Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society” 2011, Vol. 369, pp. 4798–4817. 
19 Ibidem, p. 4798. 
20 Cf. S. Chugh, Modern Macroeconomics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2015, p. 203 et seq. 
21 B. Malkiel, E. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, “The Journal of 
Finance” 1970, Vol. 25(2), pp. 383–417. 
In this case, a future economic product depends only on output from the previous 
year and random exogenous shocks. In other words, interventions do not influence the 
real economy, only price levels. Which of these two theoretical approaches to macroeco-
nomics is empirically adequate? The never-ending discussions among economists do not 
seem to lead to a constructive conclusion. Most likely, various theories adequately de-
scribe differe t kinds of macroeconomic environment. For instance, Keynes’ approach 
should be employed to deal with recessions caused by insufficient demand and the real 
business-cycle theory to understand negative, supply-side shocks. However, I should high-
light that what both Keynesian and new neoclassical economists elieve in is that mac-
roeconomic interventions aimed at stimulating the economy are only effective (i.e. result 
in any change in output) if the economic agents (customers and producers, namely) are 
not aware of the unavoidable tax increases in the future. Therefore, even if a considered 
recession is caused by demand-side shock, intervention measures might be inefficient. 
This understanding can be exemplified by the case of American economy suffering from 
stagflation in the 70s and early 80s.22
19 Ibidem, p. 4798.
20 Cf. S. Chugh, Modern Macroeconomics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2015, p. 203 et seq.
21 B. Malkiel, E. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, “The Journal of Fi-
nance” 1970, Vol. 25(2), pp. 383–417.
22 J.O.N. Perkins, The Reform of Macroeconomic Policy. From stagflation to Low or Zero Inflation, Palgrave 
MacMillan, Melbourne 2016, p. 16.
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Graph 2. Sources of uncertainty in economic policy-making
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Graph 2: Sources of uncertainty in economic policy-making.  
 
4. The ethical dilemma 
 Above, I sketched the theoretical framework of macroeconomic policymaking, which, 
considering the current state of economics and the inherent indeterminism of the economy 
itself, is a decision-making process under uncertainty. Here, I focus on answering the question 
if economic policymakers should intervene even though the results of such interventions are 
uncertain, i.e., by the definition coined by Frank Knight, the results cannot be measured even 
in a probabilistic way.  
 The policy-making dilemma can be compared to the difference between killing and 
letting die, raised by Judith Thomson.24 She considered several thought experiments with the 
aim of indicating why people judge various alternatives of the trolley problem in different 
ways. For instance, most people would pull the lever in order to save 5 lives and kill one. 
However, the same people would condemn a surgeon who transplanted the organs of 
a healthy man (killing him) to five terminally ill patients. The difference, as Thomson argued, 
is between letting five die and killing one:  
 
                                                          
24 J. Thomson, The Trolley Problem, “The Yale Law Journal” 1985, Vol. 94(6), pp. 1395–1415. 
Effects of 
intervention
Causes of 
recessionRecession
The stimuli package 
results in...
Reduced demand
Inflation or a bubble 
due to too big 
stimulus
Recovery
Prolonged recession 
because of stimulus 
being not enough
Exogenous negative 
shock
Inflation or another 
bubble
Summing up the above considerations, a policy-maker faces two kinds of uncertainty. 
First, they have to determine what caused a recession. Second, it is uncertain how the economy 
will react to the intervention.23 If the recession is caused by a negative supply-side shock, as real 
busin ss-cycle t ory sta es, th n any intervention (i.e. changes in either m netary or fiscal 
policy) will result in an inappropriately huge money supply and either inflation or a specula-
tion bubble. On the other hand, if the recession is caused by a negative demand-side shock, in-
tervention might be fruitful, but the exact results depend on the amount of money spent by the 
government and they might also result in starting an inflationary process, (see Graph 2).
4. The ethical dilemma
Above, I sketched the theoretical framework of macroeconomic policymaking, which, 
considering the current state of economics and the inherent indeterminism of the econo-
my itself, is a decision-making process under uncertainty. Here, I focus on answering the 
23 J.E. Stiglitz, Rethinking Macroeconomics: What Failed, and how to Repair It?, “Journal of the European 
Economic Association” 2011, Vol. 9(4), pp. 591–645. Stiglitz shows how macro- and macroeconomic policy 
failed sever l times along its hist ry.
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question if economic policymakers should intervene even though the results of such in-
terventions are uncertain, i.e., by the definition coined by Frank Knight, the results can-
not be measured even in a probabilistic way. 
The policy-making dilemma can be compared to the difference between killing and 
letting die, raised by Judith Thomson.24 She considered several thought experiments with 
the aim of indicating why people judge various alternatives of the trolley problem in dif-
ferent ways. For instance, most people would pull the lever in order to save 5 lives and kill 
one. However, the same people would condemn a surgeon who transplanted the organs 
of a healthy man (killing him) to five terminally ill patients. The difference, as Thomson 
argued, is between letting five die and killing one: 
It is plain that if the bystander throws the switch, he causes the trolley to hit the one, and 
thus he kills the one. It is equally plain that if the bystander does not throw the switch, 
he does not cause the trolley to hit the five, he does not kill the five, he merely fails to save 
them – he lets them die.25
When the trolley problem is discussed with non-philosophers (economics students, 
for instance), instead of focusing on the ethical dilemma, i.e. choosing if they should pull 
the lever or not, people argue that there are other options such as shouting at those stand-
ing on the track etc. However, even if the tracks were located behind a soundproof glass, 
in real life, where people are rarely tied to tracks, there is a chance that those miserable 
workers standing in front of the speeding trolley would get away. Therefore, moral judg-
ments of pulling the lever depend on the likelihood that the people on the tracks will step 
away. For instance, if the five people on the main track were young, sporty people who 
could easily run away and the one on the side track was a disabled person, then pulling 
the lever would indeed equal committing murder.
This intuition might be the reason why most people would not pull the fat man off 
the bridge to stop the trolley, but they would switch the lever. In the former case, the over-
weight passer-by would certainly die. In the latter case, other things being equal, there is an 
inherent uncertainty regarding whether the people on the track would die or step away. 
Assuming that each worker is equally likely to step off the track, it is more probable that 
the accident would end happily (i.e. without any blood being shed) if the trolley is directed 
to the side track. However, the difference in action between the trolley problem with the 
lever and pushing the fat man off the bridge is usually explained by the doctrine of double 
effect introduced by Thomas Aquinas,26 or neurobiological research which indicates that 
people think analytically in the latter case and emotionally in the former.27 Coming back 
to the subject of deciding if macroeconomic interventionism is ethically justified under 
uncertainty, I will consider the following thought experiment:
24 J. Thomson, The Trolley Problem, “The Yale Law Journal” 1985, Vol. 94(6), pp. 1395–1415.
25 Ibidem, p. 1398.
26 A. Lanteri, Ch. Chelini, S. Rizzello, op. cit.,
27 J. Greene et al., Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judg-
ment, “Cognition” 2009, Vol. 111(3), pp. 364–371.
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There is a runaway trolley speeding down the track. There are two tracks ahead (A, the 
main track and B, the side track) behind a brick wall. You are standing next to a lever 
and know that there are people on both tracks. If you pull the lever, the trolley will switch 
to a different track. Would you pull the lever?
There are three possibilities to be considered:
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pull the lever, the trolley will switch to a different track. Would you pull the 
lever? 
 There are three possibilities to be considered: 
(1) 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 > 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵 
(2) 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 < 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵 
(3) 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 = 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵 
𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴-– number of people on the main track A; 
𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵 – number of people on the side track B. 
𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵 ≥ 0. 
 According to the above-discussed definition of uncertainty, there is no knowledge on 
the number of people on the tracks. Therefore, pulling the lever can result in: 
(1) Killing a lower number of people than those saved. 
(2) Killing a greater number of people than those saved. 
(3) Killing the same number of people than those saved. 
 Since, as Thomson argued, and Philippa Foot 28  before her, killing one person is 
certainly worse than letting one person die, if the passer-by standing near the lever knew that 
s/he faced the second or third dilemma, s/he should not intervene. Therefore, intervention, i.e. 
in this case pulling the lever, is morally justified only in the first case. However, there is no 
knowledge which of the three scenarios is the case. In other words, the question raised by this 
version of the trolley-problem is as follows: is it ethically right to save an unknown number of 
people by killing an unknown number of people? Taking the thought experiment to the 
extreme, the main track might be empty. Then, as Thomson put it: 
 
Suppose there wasn't anybody on the straight track, and the bystander turned the trolley onto 
the right-hand track thereby killing the one, by not saving anybody, since nobody was at risk, 
and thus nobody needed saving.29 
 
 John Keynes, before he became interest in macroeconomics, earned his Ph.D. in 
mathematics thanks to his acclaimed dissertation on probability, where he wrote that “The 
Principle of Indifference can be claimed to support the most usual hypothesis, namely, that all 
                                                          
28 Ph. Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, “Oxford Review” 1967, No. 5. 
29 J. Thomson, op. cit., p. 1404. 
According to the above-discussed definition of uncertainty, there is no knowledge 
on the number of people on the tracks. Therefore, pulling the lever can result in:
(1) Killing a lower number of people than those saved.
(2) Killing a greater number of people than those saved.
(3) Killing the same number of people than those saved.
Since, as Thomson argued, and Philippa Foot28 before her, killing one person is cer-
tainly worse than letting one person die, if the passer-by standing near the lever knew that 
s/he faced the second or third dilemma, s/he should not intervene. Therefore, interven-
tion, i.e. in this cas  pulling the lever, s morally ju tified only in the firs  cas . However, 
there is no knowledge which of the three scenarios is the case. In other words, the question 
raised by this version of the trolley-problem is as follows: is it ethically right to save an un-
known number of peopl  by killing an unknown number of people? Taking the t ought 
experiment to the extreme, the main track might be empty. Then, as Thomson put it:
Suppose there wasn’t anybody on the straight track, and the bystander turned the trolley 
onto the right-hand track thereby killing the one, by not saving anybody, since nobody 
was at risk, and thus nobody needed saving.29
John Keynes, before he became interest in macroeconomics, earned his Ph.D. in mathe-
matics thanks to his acclaimed dissertation on probability, where he wrote that ‘The Principle 
of Indifference can be claimed to support the most usual hypothesis, namely, that all possible 
numerical ratios of black and white are equally probable.’ 30 Assuming that N=100 people 
who are randomly assigned to both tracks, then there are following assignments: 0/100; 
1/99; 2/98; … ; 98/2; 99/1; 100/0. Therefore. The probability that the number of people 
28 Ph. Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, “Oxford Review” 1967, No. 5.
29 J. Thomson, op. cit., p. 1404.
30 J. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, Dover Public ns, Mineola 2013, p. 50.
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on track A is higher than on track B is equal to the opposite situation. In this case, if killing 
is worse than letting die, then intervening is not ethically right and the passer-by should 
refrain from pulling the lever. 
Does economic policymaking differ from the above-described trolley dilemma? First, 
macroeconomic policy is connected to money and not human lives (not directly, at least). 
Second, like the differentiation of moral obligations between a passer-by standing near 
the lever and the driver of the trolley, some people (mainly macroeconomists) would ar-
gue that it is the obligation of the economic policymakers to intervene, and suspending 
action is equally unethical as a mistaken intervention. In other words, like the driver 
of the trolley, policymakers are in charge of pulling the lever. At present, they are indeed, 
but a brief look at the history of anti-cyclical economic policy shows that it resulted from 
macroeconomics, which started in the 1930s when Keynes formulated his theory. There-
fore, the ethical situation of a policy maker should be compared to the situation of the 
person choosing if s/he should pull the lever instead of the driver. Third, the question re-
garding whether economic policy really is made under uncertainty sensu stricto should 
be answered. In macroeconomics, there are several contradictory theories or competing 
schools of thought which, as I exemplified with Keynesian macroeconomics and the re-
al-business cycle theory, often support the undertaking of contradictory actions. Moreo-
ver, historical attempts at stabilizing the business cycle failed several times in many ways 
and, sometimes, caused more severe economic difficulties than the ones which were the 
reason for interventions.31 Therefore, economic policy-makers should refrain from in-
tervening, because if they do not and fail, then their actions can be indicated as a cause 
of a future economic recession. 
5. Concluding remarks
On the one hand, macroeconomic interventions are justified and desired as long as Keynes-
ian macroeconomics adequately describes the real world. On the other hand, alternative 
theories (e.g. neoclassical economics or the real business-cycle theory) argue that the active 
macroeconomic policy either is pointless or even leads to negative results such as a rise 
in inflationary pressure. Therefore, the answer to the question if policy-makers should in-
tervene depends on viewpoints on the verisimilitude of macroeconomic theories. Today, 
there is no consensus among economists, who support various and often contradictory 
stances.32
31 Two of the most sound examples are the recession transformed into the stagflation of the 70s, because of in-
appropriate macroeconomic policy and the dot com bubble recessionary measures, which co-caused the great 
recession of the early 2010s. R. Barsky, L. Kilian, Do We Really Know that Oil Caused the Great Stagflation? 
A Monetary Alternative, “NBER Macroeconomics Annual” 2001, No. 16, pp. 139–198; V. Acharya et al., The 
Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Causes and Remedies, “Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments” 2009, 
Vol. 18(2), pp. 89–137.
32 For an examplary discussion of the contradictions present in the empirical macroeconomics see: M. Ma-
ziarz, The Reinhart-Rogoff controversy as an instance of the ‘emerging contrary result’ phenomenon, “Jour-
nal of Economic Methodology” 2017, Vol. 24(3), pp. 213–225.
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Above, I have considered two alternative degrees of knowledge on economy pos-
sessed by policy-makers. First, the decision-making under risk implies calculating the 
expected utility of each decision and choosing the best option. Second, I incorporated 
uncertainty into the analysis. According to the definition widespread among economists, 
uncertainty describes the state of knowledge where either the possible outcomes or their 
probabilities are unknown. In this case, deciding if a macroeconomic intervention should 
be conducted can be compared to the analysis of the trolley problem, where the numbers 
of people standing on each track are unknown. Assuming that killing is worse than let-
ting die and, accepting the Keynesian Principle of Indifference,33 the probability that the 
number of people on one track exceeds the number standing on the other equals the op-
posite situation, refraining from pulling the lever is the ethical action from the utilitar-
ian point of view. It is better to observe a recession than to cause one. If a policy-maker 
possesses limited knowledge on the reason of the current recession and future economic 
growth, it is better not to intervene, since their action can cause either recovery or create 
another bubble (and, hence, the intervention could be indicated as the reason for the next 
economic depression, likely more severe than the current one). 
These two situations – risk and uncertainty – constitute two extremes on the scale 
of knowledge of the macroeconomic situation. Macroeconomic policymakers decide on in-
terventions under circumstances that fall between these two extremes. Therefore, the con-
clusion from the thought experiment applies to real life as long as the macroeconomic 
theory is inconsistent, which, I believe, is the case today. The history of active macroeco-
nomic policy, which started in the 1930s, and its numerous failures teach us that economy 
is such a complex system that it is still not understood well enough to enable each inter-
vention to be fruitful. Employing my reasoning to active policymaking and minimizing 
thenumber of interventions will reduce the number of failed interventions. This approach 
may not save the workers standing on the main track, i.e. it may not reduce the variability 
of economic output, but economic policy-makers will at least no longer be held responsi-
ble for the repeating recessions.
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